Russian President Vladimir Putin (L) shakes hands with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un during a meeting in Pyongyang on June 19, 2024.
Gavriel Grigorov/POOL/AFP via Getty Images
Although the specific details of the arrangement have not been made public, there has been considerable media coverage of North Korea sending combat troops to Russia to support Putin’s offensive in Ukraine. The story of how South Korea responded and cooperated with Ukraine is less well known. Let’s look at the two countries’ participation in this extraterritorial war.
As for North Korea, it’s unclear what Kim Jong Un is getting in return from Russia, whether it’s defense technology, money, investment, or possibly some combination. According to South Korean intelligence agencies, Russia pays North Korea about $2,000 per soldier per month – for a total of about $20 million per month. Regardless of the terms, North Korea has stepped up its support for the Russian war effort, from hardware to soldiers, sending a military contingent of about 10,000 people, according to U.S. Department of Defense estimates, and 11,000, according to South Korea. Unfortunately for these troops, North Korea also began to suffer its first combat deaths, with casualties exceeding 1,000, according to the U.S. government.
While North Korea has made significant contributions to Russia’s war goals, South Korea’s response has not been widely reported. Former government sources told me that immediately after Russia announced North Korea’s involvement, South Korea dispatched a military intelligence team to Kiev to brief the Ukrainian Defense Ministry. The South Korean mission quickly evolved from briefings to active on-the-ground intelligence and support, little of which was made public. South Korea also sent a delegation to NATO to support the effort, but this was for reporting and diplomatic outreach.
South Korea’s current involvement in Ukraine involves three distinct tasks:
– Communication interception, analysis and processing. North Korea is considered to have strong battlefield communications security, but incidents and leaks can occur, especially in the heat of battle. Even a private transmission on a personal cell phone, private email, or social media post can help. None of these are common in North Korea, but only one instance is needed to provide useful information. In addition, Ukraine has well-developed reporting channels for local civilians in Russia and the occupied territories.
– Training, doctrine and command. The North Korean military is first and foremost Kim Jong-un’s domestic political tool. Having not fought a war in seventy years, no one today has large-scale combat experience, although smaller units were sent to Vietnam and the Middle East. As an instrument of power and control in a one-party system, the North Korean military attaches great importance to doctrine, hierarchy, and conformity. You cannot advance in this system by being an innovator or challenging the system. South Korea’s intelligence services have deep insights into the inner workings of its northern neighbor.
– Prisoners of war and defections. This is probably the most sensitive of the three characters, as it requires direct involvement in combat, despite being a non-combat character. However, South Korea is uniquely qualified to interrogate captured North Korean soldiers, but so far there have been no reports of this. Historically, North Korea has not been kind to repatriating prisoners of war, so any captured North Korean soldiers have a built-in incentive to defect.
Putin and Kim have taken a bold step here, the largest import of military power from Asia to Europe since the Mongols. Does this reflect wisdom or desperation on the part of Putin and Kim Jong Un? One might argue that successful wars do not require mercenaries, and successful societies do not hire themselves as mercenaries. But perhaps Kim Jong Un and Putin will gain something from this adventure of expanding the war. At least Putin got relief from domestic pressure. However, for Kim Jong Un, I suspect the costs outweigh the benefits and we will not see expansion or follow-on efforts from North Korea.
One of South Korea’s goals in Ukraine is to show North Korea that it has more to lose than it gains by getting involved unprovoked. If North Korea believes it has achieved victory or “won” in this expedition, it may be emboldened to take other such moves. How and when South Korea raises North Korea’s costs remains to be seen.
